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Abstract
Delegation is commonly used in organizations to
transfer some permission by one user to another user.
However, most existing delegation schemes do not sup-
port supervision, which allows the delegators to retain
control over how the delegated permission can be ex-
ercised. In this paper, we will describe how to support
efficient authorization in delegation with supervision us-
ing proxy signature techniques.
1. Introduction
Supervision in delegation. Delegation is com-
monly used in organizations to transfer some permis-
sion by one user to another user to achieve organiza-
tion goals [8]. Consider a leave application scenario [5].
To apply for a leave, the employee should obtain the
agreement from his/her manager and the HR depart-
ment. Although the manager is authorized to signify
acceptance for any leave application, the permission
should not be discharged in an arbitrary manner. For
instance, before accepting the application for an an-
nual leave, the employee’s manager should determine
that during the period of absence, the critical tasks
which are handled by the employee can be safely dele-
gated to his/her colleagues.
Suppose the manager of the software development
group (Bob) is planning for a vacation himself and
he intends to delegate the authorization to handle the
leave application of the employees in the group to the
manager of the software maintenance group (Carol)
(See Figure 1). After that, when an employee in the
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Figure 1. Leave Application Scenario
software development group (say Dave) applies for an
annual leave, Carol will take over the responsibility of
Bob to evaluate the Dave’s application according to
the organization policy. However, Carol and Dave are
working in different groups and so Carol may have no
knowledge of the nature of the tasks being handled by
Dave. Therefore, Bob may appoint a third party (Eva)
in the software development group to perform supervi-
sion on Carol. In order for Carol to process a leave ap-
plication, she should request approval from Eva (who
determines the criticality of the tasks currently han-
dled by Dave). Carol can only accept an application if
the approval from Eva is acquired. In this example, the
delegate (Carol) is not completely trusted by the del-
egator (Bob). Therefore, Bob should appoint a third
party (Eva) to perform supervision on Carol.
The above example motivates the need for support-
ing supervision in delegation. In [5], SPKI [2] was ex-
tended to support supervision in delegation. The del-
egators in a delegation chain may appoint supervising
agents (SA). Approval from the agents is required in
order for the delegate to exercise the delegated permis-
sion.
Contribution. In this paper, we propose an im-
proved delegation scheme, which is based on the proxy
signature scheme in [6], to support efficient authoriza-
tion in delegation with supervision. One important fea-
ture of the proposed delegation scheme is that the
proxy signature generated without supervision is iden-
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tical to the proxy signature generated with supervision.
As a result, there is no need for the verifier to be aware
of how/whether supervision is performed by the delega-
tors. In this way, the verifier and the end-user (with the
associated delegators) can interact even without knowl-
edge of the internal workflow of the other parties (e.g.
there is no need for the verifier to know whether super-
vision is adopted in the end-user’s organization).
Organization. In Section 2, we will describe how to
support efficient authorization with supervision in del-
egation chains. In Section 3, the security and efficiency
of the scheme will be analyzed. Finally, in Section 4,
the summary and future research directions will be dis-
cussed.
2. Delegation With Supervision
In this section, we first perform a review on the
related proxy signature schemes. Next, we describe
how supervision can be carried out for a delegation
chain with two users. After that, we introduce the gen-
eral protocol for supporting supervision in a delegation
chain.
2.1. Proxy Signature Scheme by Kim et al.
We first outline Kim et al.’s scheme [4]. Let p and q
be large primes such that q divides p − 1. Let g be a
generator of a multiplicative subgroup of Z∗p with order
q, h() denotes a collision resistant cryptographic hash
function with range Zq, (xu ∈R Z
∗
q , yu = g
xu (mod p)))
be the private and public key for user u respectively.
Suppose user c1 intends to delegates to user c2.
User c1 randomly generates an ephemeral key pair
(kc1 ∈R Z
∗
q , rA = g
kc1 (mod p)) and computes the
proxy sc1 = xc1 h(wc1 , rc1) + kc1 (mod q) where wc1 is
the delegation warrant which specifies the public key of
Alice, Bob, and the restrictions on the use of this del-
egation.
To sign on behalf of A, user c2 generate the proxy
private key pc2 = sc1 + xc2 h(wc1 , rc1) (mod q),
randomly generates an ephemeral key pair
(k ∈R Z
∗
q , r = g
k (mod p)) and uses the Schnorr sig-
nature scheme [10]1 to sign the message using the
proxy private key pc2 . By following the verifica-
tion procedure of Schnorr signature using the proxy
public key tc2 = (yc1 yc2)
h(wc1 ,rc1)rc1(mod p), the ver-
ifier can check the validity of the signature.
1 One can use other discrete logarithm based signature schemes
like ElGamal [1] to replace Schnorr signature scheme.
2.2. Proxy signature scheme for chained
delegation
In this section, we will describe a scheme, which
is proposed in [6], to extend Kim et al.’s proxy signa-
ture scheme [4] to handle a chain of delegation. Let
C =< c1, c2, ..., cn > be a delegation chain for n > 1
where user ci delegates its signing right to user ci+1 for
i = 1, 2, . . . , n−1. We denote xci and yci to be the pri-
vate and public key of the user ci respectively. Also,
we denote wci to be the delegation warrant
2 and sci
to be the proxy issued by the user respectively. In ad-
dition, we denote (kci ∈R Z
∗
q , rci = g
kci (mod p)) to
be a randomly generated ephemeral key pair for user
ci, Aci = h(wci , rci) and pci to be the proxy private
key (which is used by the user ci to discharge the del-
egated rights). The values for sc1 , pc1 and tc1 can be
computed as described in the previous section. In gen-
eral, user ci, where 1 < i < n, receives the proxy sci−1
from user ci−1 and he generates the proxy sci for user
ci+1. User ci+1 then generates the proxy private key
pci+1 and the proxy public key tci+1 . This process is
carried out in a similar manner along the whole chain.
The values of sci (1 ≤ i < n − 1), pcj and tcj where
1 < j ≤ n in the scheme are calculated as follows.
Lemma 1 The proxy sci , the proxy private key pci+1 and
the proxy public key tci+1 for user ci+1 can be expressed
by the following equations.
sci = xc1(Ac1Ac2 . . . Aci) +
∑i
σ=2 (xcσ
∏i
j=σ−1 Acj )
+
∑i−1
σ=1(kcσ
∏i
j=σ+1 Acj ) + kci (mod q)
pci+1 = xc1(Ac1Ac2 . . . Aci) +
∑i
σ=2 (xcσ
∏i
j=σ−1 Acj )
+xci+1Aci +
∑i−1
σ=1(kcσ
∏i
j=σ+1 Acj )
+kci (mod q)
tci+1 = y
Ac1 ...Aci
c1
∏i
σ=2 y
Acσ−1 ...Aci
cσ (yci+1)
Aci∏i−1
σ=1 r
Acσ+1 ...Aci
cσ rci (mod p)
Given a proxy signature which is signed by the end-
user cn using the proxy private key pcn , the signa-
ture can be verified with the proxy public key tn us-
ing the verification equation of the Schnorr signature
scheme [10] 3.
2.3. Supporting Supervision in Delegation
In this section, we will describe how user c1 may
delegate to user c2 such that supervision is possible.
2 For each delegation warrant wci where 1 < i < n, the public
key of the delegator and delegate, the delegated authorization,
the cryptographic hash of wci−1 and the validity period of the
delegation should be included.
3 For theproof of correctness of theLemmaandthe securityanal-
ysis of the scheme, please refer to the original paper [6]
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First, user c1 generates sc1 as described in the previ-
ous section. The delegation warrant wci should specify
the permission to be delegated (which may be general
in nature, e.g. reading all the files in a web server).
If the delegator intends to appoint an SA, the proxy
should be distributed to the SA of user c1 in a secure
manner (such that it can be kept secret from user c2).
In this way, user c2 cannot exercise the delegated per-
mission directly.
To exercise the delegated permission, user c2 should
prepare an access specification M (which includes the
details of a particular access, such as the URL of the
file to be read) and send it to c1 (or his/her SA) for
approval. If approved, c1 cooperates with the dele-
gate (user c2) to sign M using some discrete-logarithm
based multi-signature schemes (e.g. 2Schnorr signing
protocol [9]).
2.4. The Proposed Delegation Protocol
Now, we generalize the delegation protocol to han-
dle a delegation chain. In the following discussion, we
consider the delegation chain C =< c1, c2, ..., cn > for
n > 1 where user c1 performs delegation to user c2, who
further delegates until delegation is performed to user
cn (the end-user). We first introduce the notion of par-
tial proxy. For each user ci, where 1 ≤ i < n, we define
the partial proxy for user ci to be
s′ci =
{
sc1 = xc1Ac1 + kc1 (mod q) for i = 1
xciAci−1Aci + kci (mod q) for 1 < i < n
For 1 < j < n, scj can be computed from
{s′c1, s
′
c2
, ..., s′cj} as follows.
Lemma 2 scj =
∑j−1
m=1(s
′
cm
∏j
l=m+1 Acl) +
s′cj (mod q).
The Lemma can be proved by induction but the de-
tails are skipped due to space limitation.
The delegation process for C is as follows. User c1
first generates the partial proxy s′c1 . The partial proxy
should be transferred to user c2 (if SA is not appointed)
or his/her SA (if SA is appointed). An encrypted chan-
nel is necessary only when an SA is appointed. In both
cases, the delegate or the SA should verify the par-
tial proxy by checking if gs
′
c1 = y
Ac1
c1 rc1 (mod p).
For the other users ci (1 < i < n) to re-delegate,
ci should first compute s
′
ci
. Suppose an SA is not ap-
pointed, ci transfers s
′
ci
and all the partial proxy he/she
receives from the delegator to the delegate (user ci+1)
(without a secure channel). On the other hand, if an
SA is appointed, ci should transfer s
′
ci
to the SA us-
ing an encrypted channel. In addition, he/she should
transfer the partial proxy he/she receives from the del-
egators in the delegation chain to the delegate (user
ci+1). In both cases, for each partial proxy s
′
cj
, the
delegate or the SA should verify the partial proxy
by checking if g
s′cj = y
Acj
cj rcj (mod p) (if j = 1) or
g
s′cj = y
Acj−1Acj
cj rcj (mod p) (if j > 1) .
To describe how user cn may request access, we
define o(ci) to be the set of partial proxy owned by
the user ci, D(C) to be the set of all the delegators
{c1, c2, ..., cn−1} in C, S(C) ⊆ D(C) to be the set of the
delegators who appoint SA in C, U(C) = S(C) ∪ {cn}
and N(C) = D(C) \ S(C). For each user ci, oci can be
computed where
o(ci) =


φ ci ∈ N(C)
{s′ci} ci ∈ S(C)⋃
cj∈N(C)
sc′
j
ci = cn
As an example, consider a delegation chain C =<
c1, c2, c3, c4, c5 > where user c1 and user c4 appoint
their own SA. User c1 first generates and transfers
the partial proxy s′c1 to the appointed SA with an
encrypted channel. After that, user c2 re-delegates
by generating and transferring the partial proxy s′c2
to user c3. Afterwards, user c3 generates the partial
proxy s′c3 . He/she transfers s
′
c3
, and also the partial
proxy s′c2 received from user c2 to user c4. For user
c4, since he/she appoints an SA, the partial proxy s
′
c4
should be transferred to his/her agent with an en-
crypted channel. In addition, he/she should transfer
the partial proxy received from the delegators (which
includes s′c2 and s
′
c3
) to user c5. In this example, we
have D(C) = {c1, c2, c3, c4} and S(C) = {c1, c4}. Also,
we have o(ci) = φ for i = {2, 3}, o(cj) = s
′
cj
for
j = {1, 4} and o(c5) = {s
′
c2
, s′c3}
Suppose user cn intends to exercise the delegated
permission, he should cooperate with the SA appointed
by the users in S(C) to sign the access specification M
4. Each user ci ∈ U(C) (or the appointed SA) gener-
ates the signing key
x′ci =
{ ∑
s′cm∈o(ci)
s′cmvm + xcnAcn−1 if i = n∑
s′cm∈o(ci)
s′cmvm otherwise
where vm =
∏n−1
l=m+1 Acl (if n > 2 and m < n − 1) or
vm = 1 (if m = n − 1) using the partial proxy he/she
owns in the delegation chain. In addition, each user ci ∈
U(C) (or the appointed SA) generates an ephemeral
4 For the sake of illustration, we will make use of Schnorr signa-
ture scheme for generating the signature. However, other dis-
crete logarithm based digital signature schemes may also be
used.
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key pair (k(ci) ∈R Z
∗
q , r(ci) = g
k(ci) (mod p)) and
they agree on the value of r =
∏
ci∈U(C)
r(ci). For the
simplicity of discussion, we assume there is a secure
broadcast channel shared by all the signers in the del-
egation chain to agree on the value of r in a signing
operation 5 .
Each user ci ∈ U(C) (or the appointed
SA) generates a partial signature s(ci) =
x′cih(M, r) + k(ci) (mod q) and they form (r, s)
where k =
∑
ci∈U(C)
k(ci)(mod q), r = g
k(mod p) and
s =
∑
ci∈U(C)
s(ci) (mod q)
Theorem 1 The tuple (r, s) is a Schnorr signature with
the proxy private key pcn .
Proof We prove by showing s = pnh(M, r) +
k (mod q). For clarity of presentation, we as-
sume the following operations are performed modulo
q.
s =
∑
ci∈U(C)
s(ci)
=
∑
ci∈U(C)
(x′cih(M, r) + k(ci))
= (
∑
ci∈S(C)
x′ci + x
′
cn
)h(M, r) + k
= (
∑
ci∈S(C)
(
∑
s′cm∈o(ci)
s′cmvm)
+
∑
s′cm∈o(cn)
s′cmvm + xcnAcn−1)h(M, r) + k
= (
∑
ci∈S(C)
s′civi +
∑
s′cm∈
⋃
cj∈N(C)
sc′
j
s′cmvm
+xcnAcn−1)h(M, r) + k (Definition of o(ci))
= (
∑
ci∈S(C)
s′civi +
∑
cj∈N(C)
s′cjvj
+xcnAcn−1)h(M, r) + k
= (
∑
ci∈D(C)
s′civi + xcnAcn−1)h(M, r) + k
= (
∑
s′cm∈{s
′
c1
,...,sc′
n−1
} s
′
cm
vm
+xcnAcn−1)h(M, r) + k
= (
∑n−1
i=1 s
′
ci
vi + xcnAcn−1)h(M, r) + k
Here, we have two cases. Case 1: n = 2
s = (s′c1v1 + xc2Ac1)h(M, r) + k
= pc2h(M, r) + k
Case 2: n > 2
s = (
∑n−2
i=1 s
′
ci
vi + s
′
cn−1
vn−1 + xcnAcn−1)h(M, r)
+k
= (scn−1 + xcnAcn−1)h(M, r) + k (Lemma 2)
= (pcn)h(M, r) + k (Lemma 1)
From Theorem 1, (r, s) is a proxy signature for the
delegation chain C and so it can be verified with the
proxy public key tcn using the same procedure as de-
scribed in Section 2.2.
The partial proxy can be managed in a num-
ber of ways. For instance, the delegator may share
5 Alternatively, multi-signature protocols such as [7] can be
adopted in the signing protocol.
his/her partial proxy with some secret sharing schemes
(e.g. [11]) among a group of SA such that m out
of n users in the group is required to signify accep-
tance. Also, an appointed SA may re-delegate the re-
sponsibility for performing supervision to another
agent by further distributing the partial proxy us-
ing an encrypted channel. Therefore, the proposed
protocol provides a flexible way to support supervi-
sion in delegation.
3. Discussion and Security Analysis
The proposed delegation scheme is more efficient in
terms of the verification of authorization when com-
pared with the scheme in [5], which is based on SPKI.
Given a proxy public key which signifies that a cer-
tain authorization is propagated along a certain dele-
gation chain and a signed message which can be veri-
fied by the corresponding proxy public key, it can be
shown that the message is signed by an authorized user
(which knows the corresponding public key). Thus, ver-
ification of the authorization certificates along the del-
egation chain is not required. Also, the delegate will
not be able to generate the proxy signature by him-
self/herself if one or more SA are appointed. There-
fore, the ability to sign an access specification means
that approval from the SA has been acquired. As a con-
sequence, there is no need to verify the approval signa-
ture of the SA and efficient access control can be sup-
ported.
The security of the protocol relies on the security
of the underlying delegation scheme [6] and the multi-
signature scheme (if one is adopted). In this paper, we
mainly focus on the security of the use of partial proxy.
Consider a delegation chain C =< c1, c2, ..., ci >. We
first consider the case where user ci does not appoint
an SA. For the case where i = 1, s′ci = sci and it has
been shown that the proxy can be transferred with-
out a secure channel [3]. For the case where i > 1,
s′ci = xciAci−1Aci + kci = (xci−1Aci−1)h(wci , rci)+ kci ,
which is essentially the signature of wci using the
Schnorr signature scheme with xciAci−1 as the secret
signing key. If the underlying Schnorr signature scheme
is secure, an attacker cannot alter wci (the message to
be signed). Given a partial proxy for a certain delega-
tion chain (a signature of a delegation warrant), it is
infeasible to determine the partial proxy for another
delegation chain (a signature for another delegation
warrant) if the underlying signature scheme is secure.
Also, although Aci−1 may be publicly known, the at-
tacker cannot determine the secret signing key and so
he/she cannot compromise the private key of user ci
even with the partial proxy s′ci . In addition, the par-
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tial proxy cannot be misused by the attacker. Since
the public key of the delegate (user ci+1) is included in
wci , only user ci+1 can make use of the proxy to create
proxy signature or perform further delegation. There-
fore, the transfer of partial proxy does not require a
secure channel to protect its confidentiality.
Now, suppose user ci appoints an SA when perform-
ing delegation to user ci+1. The partial proxy s
′
ci
is
given to the SA securely and it should be kept secret
from the delegate. As discussed, given the partial proxy
s′ci , potential attackers (which include the SA) cannot
determine the private key of the delegator ci. In addi-
tion, the SA themselves cannot exercise the permission
associated with the partial proxy because the public
key of the delegate is included in the delegation war-
rant of the partial proxy. Only the delegate (user ci+1)
will be able to exercise the permission associated with
the delegation chain. Therefore, the SA, who do not
know the private key of user ci+1, cannot exercise the
permission even though they know the partial proxy.
On the other hand, since ci does not know s
′
ci
, the del-
egate will not be able to create a valid proxy signature
without the cooperation of the SA.
4. Summary and Future Research Di-
rections
A new and efficient delegation protocol to support
supervision is proposed in this paper. The delegation
protocol inherits the advantage of the proxy signature,
which supports efficient verification of authorization.
One of the novel features of this protocol is that the
verification of the approval signature by SA is not re-
quired. The ability to sign an access specification us-
ing the proxy for a certain delegation chain implicitly
means that the end-user is authorized by the delegators
and the approval from the SA has been acquired. By
performing one signature verification using the proxy
public key for a certain delegation chain, the autho-
rization of the delegate and the approval of the SA can
be verified at the same time. Therefore, efficient ac-
cess control can be supported. In addition, in the pro-
posed delegation scheme, the proxy signature gener-
ated without supervision is identical to the proxy sig-
nature generated with supervision. As a result, there is
no need for the verifier to be aware of how/whether su-
pervision is performed by the delegators. In this way,
the verifier and the end-user (with the associated dele-
gators) can interact even without knowledge of the in-
ternal workflow of the other parties.
The proposed delegation protocol requires the par-
tial proxy to be kept and managed by different users in
the organization. Therefore, one possible future work is
to provide an infrastructure to allow the partial proxy
to be managed in a decentralized manner. Also, other
issues such as the revocation of delegation should also
be studied.
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